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STANDING TO CHALLENGE STATE AND LOCAL
IMMIGRATION REGULATION: HOW THE NOTION OF
EXPRESSIVE INJURY CAN RESTORE FEDERAL POWER
OVER IMMIGRATION
Timothy A. Newman*
INTRODUCTION
John Doe 1 was a tenant in Hazleton, Pennsylvania, in September, 2006.' Because
he was not a United States citizen or permanent legal resident, he was confident the
United States government could deport him at any time. But the city council of the
town he called home, and not the federal government, was the first to take action
against him.2
Most are familiar with the actions of Hazleton's city council during the summer
and fall of 2006. In response to a recent influx of undocumented immigrants, the
council passed a series of ordinances aimed at reducing the number of undocumented
immigrants living within the city and thwarting the problems city leaders perceived
as resulting from that influx.' Ordinances prohibiting the employment of illegal im-
migrants, requiring apartment dwellers to prove legal status prior to renting, and pro-
hibiting employers from translating documents into any language other than English
were all part of the effort.4
John Doe 1, other illegal alien tenants, and a host of American citizens filed suit
against the city of Hazleton.5 On July 26, 2007, the U.S. District Court for the Middle
District of Pennsylvania acknowledged the standing of John Doe 1 and others to chal-
lenge these ordinances, granting relief in the form of a permanent injunction.6 In
short, the plaintiffs, including an undocumented immigrant, were granted standing
to challenge a local ordinance pertaining to the conduct of illegal aliens.7
* J.D., William & Mary School of Law, 2009; B.A., Texas A&M University, Class of
2005. Thank you to my family.
See Lozano v. Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477,496 (M.D. Pa. 2007) (citing the Deposition
of John Doe 1, Dec. 8, 2006).
2 Id. at 496-97.
3 Id. at 484.
4 See id.; Michael Powell & Michelle Garcia, Pennsylvania City Puts Illegal Immigrants
on Notice, WASH. POST, Aug. 22, 2006, at A3.
' Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 477.
6 Id. at 555.
1 Id. at 504.
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Halfway across the nation, in a perhaps less-publicized but no less important
scenario, a group of American citizen-students, from states other than Kansas, chal-
lenged a Kansas statute pertaining to illegal aliens.8 The statute, passed on July 1,
2004, is one of several so-called state "DREAM Acts." 9 The statute effectively
allowed undocumented immigrants to pay in-state tuition rates while attending state
universities in Kansas. 10
The District Court of Kansas denied standing to those students in regard to some
grounds for their action and held that no private right of action had been created for
others." On August 30, 2007, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district
court's decision. 2 In short, American citizens were denied standing to challenge a
state statute governing the rights of illegal aliens. 3
With the rising number of foreigners entering the United States illegally, regu-
lation of immigration is increasingly important. In 2004, an estimated 10.3 million
unauthorized migrants, or illegal aliens, were present in this country. 4 About
eighty-six percent of that 10.3 million arrived in the United States sometime after
1990.15 Calls for legislation restricting this movement have increased, citing a per-
ceived strain on public resources, competition for jobs, diminished aesthetic appeal
of communities, increased crime rates, 16 and national security concerns. 17 Not all
of these perceptions, however, are supported by empirical data. 18 Some even assert
that racial animus is the true motivation behind this recent push for legislation. 9
8 Day v. Sebelius, 376 F. Supp. 2d 1022 (D. Kan. 2005), affd sub nom. Day v. Bond,
500 F.3d 1127 (10th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 2987 (2008).
9 Id. at 1025. These statutes are called "DREAM Acts" because the benefits they provide
to undocumented immigrants are similar to those that were part of a failed federal attempt
at immigration reform, the DREAM Act of 2007. S. 1348, 110th Cong. § § 621-632 (2007).
10 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 76-731a (2008).
" Sebelius, 376 F. Supp. 2d at 1031-40.
12 Day v. Bond, 500 F.3d 1127 (10th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 2987 (2008).
" Id. at 1139-40.
14 See JEFFREY S. PASSEL, PEW HISPANIC CENTER, UNAUTHORIZED MIGRANTS: NUMBERS
AND CHARACrERISTICs 3 (2005), available at http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/46.pdf.
15 See id. at 5.
16 See, e.g., Ryan D. Frei, Comment, Reforming U.S. Immigration Policy in an Era of
Latin American Immigration: The Logic Inherent in Accommodating the Inevitable, 39 U.
RICH. L. REV. 1355, 1379-81 (2005).
17 See Eric L'Heureux Issadore, Note, Is Immigration Still Exclusively a Federal Power?
A Preemption Analysis on Legislation by Hazleton, Pennsylvania Regulating Illegal Immigration,
52 ViL. L. REV. 331, 340 (2007).
8 See, e.g., Marlin W. Burke, Reexamining Immigration: Is It a Local orNational Issue?,
84 DENV. U. L. REv. 1075, 1076 (2007) (discussing the lack of empirical evidence supporting
the notion that the presence of illegal immigrants leads to unfair competition for jobs).
'9 See, e.g., id. (discussing the perceived threat immigration poses to the "racial, religious,
and social makeup of the country").
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Regardless of what brought about the desire for regulation, Congress has provided
no relief.20 In the wake of federal inaction, states and localities have attempted to
fill the void with immigration regulation of their own,21 and their actions have been
challenged in the courts. Courts have upheld some of these regulations-denying
standing to those who brought the challenge 22 -while striking down others on con-
stitutional and federal preemption grounds. Important in those cases striking down
state or local regulations is the discussion of constitutional standing to challenge.24
The purpose of this Note is to explore, paying particular attention to the courts'
determination of standing, the effect of these decisions on the regulation of immigra-
tion. This discussion is not concerned with illegal immigrants' access to courts, but
with standing in the context of immigration law.
Part I discusses the history of immigration regulation in the United States, address-
ing specifically the fact that the power to regulate has traditionally been enjoyed by
Congress. Part HI examines the impact of immigration and the state and local legis-
lation that has resulted. Part Il describes two representative attempts by state and
local governments to provide that relief. Courts' responses, specifically the granting
or denial of standing, will be discussed in detail. Part IV discusses the results of these
court holdings in the context of immigration law. This Note argues that divergent
determinations of standing create inconsistencies and uncertainty in terms of which
level of government has the power to regulate in this increasingly important area of
the law. Finally, Part V proposes some solutions to the problem, opting for one that
would grant standing to citizens based on expressive injury.
The purpose in writing this Note is to bring attention to an emerging dynamic
that could be problematic in the resolution of immigration struggles now and in the
future. In discussing the problem and possible solutions, the goal is to encourage
productive and efficient resolution of what could become a serious problem.2
20 Issadore, supra note 17 (citing numerous attempts by Congress to pass immigration
reform legislation, all to no avail).
2 See, e.g., Hazleton, Pa., Ordinance 2006-18 (Sept. 21,2006), available at http://www
.aclu.org/pdfs/immigrants/hazleton secondordinance.pdf (requiring, inter alia, that landlords
verify the legal status of immigrants before leasing property to them).
22 See, e.g., Day v. Bond, 500 F.3d 1127 (10th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 2987
(2008).
23 See, e.g., Lozano v. Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477, 496 (M.D. Pa. 2007).
24 See, e.g., id.
25 For purposes of this Note, the following definitions will be used: 1) Alien: "A person
who resides within the borders of a country but is not a citizen or subject of that country."
BLACK'S LAW DICIONARY 79 (8th ed. 2004); 2) Citizen: "A person who, by either birth or
naturalization, is a member of a political community, owing allegiance to the community and
being entitled to enjoy all its civil rights and protections; a member of the civil state, entitled
to all its privileges." Id. at 261; 3) Illegal alien or undocumented alien: "An alien who enters
a country at the wrong time or place, eludes an examination by officials, obtains entry by
fraud, or enters into a sham marriage to evade immigration laws." Id. at 79; 4) Immigrant: "A
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I. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE: FEDERAL POWER OVER THE REGULATION OF
IMMIGRATION
A. Roots of Exclusive Federal Power
1. Early Viewpoint
The notion of Congress' exclusive power to regulate immigration is by no
means a recent construct. In the Federalist Papers, John Jay spoke generally about
the advantages of a united central government in the context of safety from foreign
powers and internal discord.26 James Madison discussed the dangers associated with
allowing individual states to implement their own naturalization laws, asserting that
"[w]e owe it to mere casualty, that very serious embarrassments on this subject have
been hitherto escaped. '27 At the root of this idea was the reality that the "Union
w[ould] undoubtedly be answerable to foreign Powers for the conduct of its mem-
bers. '28 Because the laws concerning naturalization and immigration were viewed
as inextricably intertwined with foreign affairs, it was thought best to delegate the
power of immigration regulation to the federal government. 29
2. Supreme Court Cases
The Supreme Court advanced a similar notion in the late 1800s. In the years
following the Civil War, Congress, in an effort to counteract a reduction in available
labor, had purposely avoided legislation that would constrict immigration from foreign
countries.30 At times, Congress even encouraged an influx of foreigners to the United
States.3 The Burlingame Treaty of 1868, for example, established friendly relations
between the United States and China and stated that Chinese citizens present in the
United States were to "enjoy the same privileges, immunities and exemptions" as
those enjoyed by American citizens.32
person who arrives in a country to settle there permanently; a person who immigrates." Id.
at 765.
26 See THE FEDERALIST No. 3 (John Jay).
27 THE FEDERALIST NO. 42, at 237 (James Madison) (E.H. Scott ed., 1898).
28 THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 435 (Alexander Hamilton) (E.H. Scott ed., 1898).
29 See THE FEDERALIST Nos. 3, 4, 5 (John Jay), No. 42 (James Madison), NO. 80
(Alexander Hamilton). As James Madison pointed out, there are two sources of potential
danger when allowing non-federal entities to regulate immigration-unfair treatment of immi-
grants at the hands of the law and creating such a confusing regime of law that immigrants
are unable to navigate through the system and follow the rules. See THE FEDERALIST No. 42
(James Madison), supra note 27, at 237-38. The latter, as will be shown, may become more
of an issue as states and localities begin to try their hand at immigration regulation.
30 See DEBRA L. DELAET, U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY IN AN AGE OFRIGHTS 25-26 (2000).
"' See id.
32 Burlingame Treaty, U.S.-P.R.C., art. VI, July 28, 1868, 16 Stat. 739; see also Chae
Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581,592-93 (1889) (discussing the Burlingame Treaty).
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In subsequent years, however, viewpoints concerning foreign immigrants shifted
from one of welcome to one of disdain. Both the federal and many state governments
passed legislation aimed at stemming the flow of immigrants into the United States.33
Immigrants challenged many of these statutes both at the federal and state level?4 The
Supreme Court's treatment of the statutes was very different depending on whether
the statute being challenged was federal or local.35
The first challenge to federal law came in Chae Chan Ping v. United States,
known as the Chinese Exclusion Case.36 In Chae Chan Ping, the plaintiff, a legal
Chinese resident and worker in the United States, was denied entry upon his return
from a trip to China.37 During his leave, Congress had nullified the law that would
have made his entry possible with a simple certificate of residence.38 Instead of being
allowed simple admission, he was denied entry altogether.
39
The Supreme Court approved the federal government's exclusion of the plain-
tiff.' In so holding, the Court announced a theory of immigration known as the
plenary power doctrine.4 1 Under this doctrine, sovereign nations have the absolute
right to exclude.4 2 Under the United States Constitution, that power has been dele-
gated to the federal government, and as a result, the judiciary will not review decisions
made by the federal government in the context of exclusion.43 In 1893, the Court
extended the notion of plenary power to deportation.
4
During this same period when federal immigration statutes were upheld, state
statutes were largely struck down. Many states, faced with supporting a quickly
increasing population which included large numbers of infirm and unemployed, con-
sidered legislation a necessity to preserve resources for their own citizens.45 The
Supreme Court first addressed these statutes in Henderson v. Mayor of New York
"' The Chinese Exclusion Laws of 1884, 1888, and 1892 imposed progressively harsher
restrictions on foreign immigrants hoping to enter the United States. See Act of July 5, 1884,
ch. 220, 23 Stat. 115; Act of Oct. 19, 1888, ch. 1210, 25 Stat. 565; Act of May 5, 1892, ch. 60,
27 Stat. 25; see also Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 276 (1875) (challenging a California
immigration statute).
4 See infra notes 40-50 and accompanying text.
35 See Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. 581; infra text accompanying notes 40-53.
36 130 U.S. 581.
17 Id. at 582.
38 id.
39 Id.
40 Id. at 581.
41 See id. at 603-10.
42 See id. at 606-07.
43 See id. at 609.
4 Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893).
45 See, for example, the arguments made by New York and California in support of the
statutes at issue in Henderson and Chy Lung. Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 92 U.S. 259,
264 (1875); Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92. U.S. 275, 277 (1875).
46 92 U.S. 259.
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and Chy Lung v. Freeman.47 At issue in these cases, which were considered jointly,
were state statutes that regulated the conditions under which masters of vessels
could land foreign passengers at ports within the states of New York and California,
respectively. 48 The Court, citing the dangers of allowing states to regulate an area
of law with such great foreign policy implications, struck down the statutes on pre-
emption and supremacy grounds.49 This result is in stark contrast to the decision in the
Chinese Exclusion Case, where the Court affirmed the federal government's absolute
power to exclude and deport.5 °
A decade later, the Supreme Court addressed a city ordinance bearing on the treat-
ment of undocumented immigrants present in the United States.5' At issue in Yick
Wo v. Hopkins was a San Francisco ordinance that prohibited the use of laundries
constructed of wood. 2 The Court cited the Fourteenth Amendment in holding that
the discriminatory enforcement of the ordinance by the city violated equal protection
guaranteed to all present within the United States. 53 Again, in stark contrast to the
rulings of the Court with respect to federal regulation of immigration, the Court struck
down the regulation, refusing to acknowledge any power over immigration other than
federal power.
B. An Historic Cycle of State Challenges to Federal Power
The late-1 800s was not the only time in which states have attempted to regulate
immigration. In the years leading up to World War I, states were again overrun by
foreign immigrants searching for a better life.' And again, states responded by creat-
ing legislation aimed at preserving resources for their respective citizens. In People
v. Crane, the Court of Appeals of New York addressed the constitutionality of a New
York statute that denied government contracts to those employing anyone not a citizen
47 92 U.S. 275.
48 Henderson, 92 U.S. at 259-60; Chy Lung, 92 U.S. at 275.
4' Henderson, 92 U.S. at 260; Chy Lung, 92 U.S. at 275-76.
50 See Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
"' Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
52 Id. at 357.
" Id. at 373-74. It may seem suspect that equal protection did not prevent the federal
government from discriminating against foreign-born residents, but the Fifth Amendment
was not considered to include an equal protection element until 1954. See Bolling v. Sharpe,
347 U.S. 497 (1954). It should also be noted that although immigration cases reached the
Supreme Court prior to the Civil War, those decided in the decades following the Civil War
provide the most useful backdrop for our discussion because they focused on the distinction
between federal and local regulation. See, e.g., Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 356 (scrutinizing a San
Francisco city ordinance through the prism of Fourteenth Amendment equal protection).
'4 See AUGUSTINE J. KPOSOwA, THE IMPACT OF IMMIGRATION ON THE UNITED STATES
ECONOMY 19 (1998) (citing EDITH ABBOTr, HISTORICAL ASPECTS OF TLE IMMIGRATION
PROBLEM (1926)).
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of the United States. 55 It was asserted that the state's right to pass such legislation
was grounded in the interest of its citizens.56 Although the court upheld the statute
as not in violation of the Equal Protection Clause, Justice Cardozo was careful to point
out that "[i]t is a denial of the equal protection of the laws when the government, in
its capacity as a lawmaker, regulating, not its own property, but private business, bars
the alien from the right to trade and labor., 57 The Supreme Court affirmed this deci-
sion in Crane v. People of the State of New York, 58 but only on the narrow grounds
of "special public interest."59
Much like it had done after the Civil War, Congress allowed, and even encour-
aged, immigration to the United States in an effort to replace the labor shortage
following World War 11.60 As they had in the past, states responded to the resulting
influx by passing their own immigration reforms, and citizen challenges to these re-
forms soon came before the courts.6' In Hines v. Davidowitz, the Supreme Court
struck down a Pennsylvania alien registration statute on preemption grounds.62 In
Takahashi v. Fish and Game Commission, the Court struck down a California statute
restricting fishing licenses to United States citizens on similar grounds. 63 In Takahashi,
the Court denied California's assertion of "special public interest,"64 an argument suc-
cessfully argued by the state of New York, although not in so many words, in Crane
three decades before.65
It is important to note that in each wave of state attempts to regulate immigration,
it was the judicial branch that stepped in to reassert federal authority. Since the last
great wave, the Supreme Court recognized the exclusive power of Congress to regulate
immigration in the context of granting nonimmigrant visas,6' employment of aliens
not lawfully admitted to residence in the United States,67 denial of in-state tuition to
55 108 N.E. 427 (N.Y. 1915).
56 Id. at 429.
57 Id. at 432.
58 239 U.S. 195 (1915).
'9 The notion of "special public interest" was asserted but denied by the Court only thirty
years later in Torao Takahashi v. Fish and Game Commission. 334 U.S. 410 (1948); see supra
notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
60 See, e.g., KPOSOWA, supra note 54, at 21 (discussing the Bracero Program permitting
Mexican farm workers temporary entry and stay in the U.S.).
61 See, e.g., Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 61 n.8 (1941) (discussing actions by state
and local governments in the context of immigration regulation).
62 Id. at 53.
63 334 U.S. 410 (1948).
64 Id. at 417-20.
65 People v. Crane, 108 N.E. 427, 430-33 (N.Y. 1915).
' Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972).
67 DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976). Although the Supreme Court upheld the
California statute in question, it did so because there was no evidence that the statute was at
odds with federal legislation, not because Congress did not enjoy exclusive power to regulate
immigration. Id. at 354-55.
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nonimmigrant aliens and their dependents,6" and release of alien juveniles following
detention on suspicion of being deportable. 69 But states have not been disheartened
by the Court's historic and recent assertions that the federal government retains power
over immigration regulation. An increasing number of cases relating to state and local
immigration regulation have come before federal district courts and courts of appeal
in recent years.7" These cases will be discussed in greater detail in Part Ill.
UI. CURRENT IMMIGRATION AND LEGISLATIVE TRENDS
The flow of illegal immigrants to the United States is on the rise and states have
responded by passing legislation regulating those immigrants' conduct.7' Between
January and December of 2007, state legislatures considered more than 1500 pieces
of immigration legislation.72 Two hundred forty of those bills considered became
law during that same time.73 The number of enactments in 2007 nearly tripled from
2006. 74 Over forty-five states stepped in to regulate where Congress had not.75
A. Numbers
At the root of state and local action is a dramatic influx in the flow of immigrants,
legal or not, to the United States. In 2003, more than thirty-three million people pres-
ent in the United States were foreign born.76 This is more than double the number of
immigrants that were in this country in 1980. 77 Not only is the number of immigrants
on the rise, but the rate at which immigrants enter the country is on the rise at an un-
precedented clip.78 More than thirty-six percent of all foreign born persons present
in America in 2003 had entered the country between 1990 and 2000.7' This decade
68 Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1 (1982).
69 Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292 (1993).
70 See, e.g., Lozano v. Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477 (M.D. Pa. 2007); Day v. Sebelius,
376 F. Supp. 2d 1022 (D. Kan. 2005), affd sub nom. Day v. Bond, 500 F.3d 1127 (10th Cir.
2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 2987 (2008).
71 See NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, 2007 ENACTED STATE
LEGISLATION RELATED TO IMMIGRANTS AND IMMIGRATION (2008) [hereinafter NCSL
SURVEY], available at http://www.ncsl.org/print/immig/2007immigrationfinal.pdf.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 LUKEJ. LARSEN, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, THEFOREIGN-BORN POPULATION IN ThE UNrrED
STATES: 2003, at 1 (2004), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2004pubs/p20-55 1.pdf.
7 Steven A. Camarota, Census Releases Immigrant Numbers for Year 2000, CTR. FOR
IMMIGRATION STUDIES, June 4, 2002, http://www.cis.org/articles/2002/censuspr.html.
78 See id.
7' LARSEN, supra note 76, at 3.
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of increase is second to none in the nation's history.80 As a result, the foreign born
population is out-pacing the native population, comprising an increasingly larger
sector of the country's total population.8'
B. Local Impact and Perceived Problems
Local and state government officials argue that they bear the burden of supporting
increasing immigrant populations, especially in the context of illegal immigrants.
82
Job displacement and exhaustion of public resources are among the most common
complaints, 83 and empirical evidencem (and even the Supreme Court") supports the
notion that illegal immigrants deprive American citizens of jobs and depress wages.
Empirical evidence also supports the notion that public resources are exhausted by
illegal immigrant populations.86 The cost of public assistance aimed at illegal immi-
grants in America totaled $5.4 billion in 1990, and $11.9 billion was spent on public
assistance and displacement costs in 1992.87 Couple these estimates with the increas-
ing rate of immigration, and the numbers become astounding.
A representative example of the aggressive assertions concerning the burdens
carried by local and state governments as a result of illegal immigration came from
Oklahoma State Representative Randy Terrill, arguing the necessity of Oklahoma
legislation regulating immigration. Terrill claimed illegal immigrants contribute at
best $21 million to the state fisc in income and sales tax, while costing the state hun-
dreds of millions of dollars in increased public services ranging from the increased
8 Other than the 1990s, the greatest increase was thirty-one percent in the decade from
1900-1910. Camarota, supra note 77.
81 Id. Needless to say, not all immigrants to the United States are legal. Of the over thirty-
three million foreign born present in the United States, an estimated ten million are citizens,
and an estimated seventeen million are non-citizens. A. DIANNE SCHMIDLEY, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, PROFILE OF THE FOREIGN-BORN POPULATION IN THE UNITED STATES: 2000, at 3
(2001), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2002pubs/p23-206.pdf.
82 Julian L. Simon addresses this issue in some detail, including reference to empirical
data and interviews with immigrants as they leave the country. See JULIAN L. SIMON, THE
ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OFIMMIGRATION 313-21 (1999). Simon arrived at the conclusion
that although the overall national effect immigrants have on public coffers is positive, the effect
on state and local coffers may very well be negative. Id. at 315; see also Michael J. Almonte,
Note, State and Local Law Enforcement Response to Undocumented Immigrants: Can We
Make the Rules, Too?, 72 BROOK. L. REv. 655,660-61 (2007) (discussing empirical evidence
supporting the notion that local communities are burdened by immigration).
83 See Almonte, supra note 82.
Id. (citing Frei, supra note 16, at 1379).
85 Id. (citing DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 356-57 (1976)).
86 Id. (citing David M. Turoff, Note, IllegalAliens: Can Monetary Damages Be Recovered
from Countries of Origin Under an Exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28
BROOK. J. INT'LL. 179, 184 n.40 (2002)).
87 Turoff, supra note 86, at 183-84.
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costs of providing medical care to uninsured illegal immigrants to the increased
costs of law enforcement as a result of illegal immigrant activities.8 Rape, murder,
drugs, prostitution rings, gangs, and horse gambling operations are among the activ-
ities illegal immigrants are allegedly responsible for.89 According to Terrill, the in-
creased use of non-emergency medical care by illegal immigrants is "literally killing
the [University of Oklahoma] Medical Center."' 90 Mayor Lou Barletta of Hazleton,
Pennsylvania, cited similar concerns in support of Hazleton's llegal Immigration
Relief Act.9'
C. Why States and Localities Are Attempting to Regulate Immigration
Because of the costs to local and state government associated with increased
immigration, either real or only perceived, leaders and the public have pleaded for
action from Congress. Consider the following passage from the Dallas Morning
News, one of many members of the media to address the situation: "Gov[ernor] Rick
Perry is one of 13 governors who say this situation needs fixing. We agree.... This
newspaper favors addressing the aspects of illegal immigration, including Dream
Act provisions, through comprehensive reform." 92
Although Congress made several attempts to pass comprehensive immigration
regulation during 2007, those attempts have failed. The Comprehensive Immigration
Reform Act of 2007 was one of several measures considered and rejected by Con-
gress.93 As will be shown in Part mII, the void left by Congress in the context of immi-
gration law has been filled by state and local measures targeting illegal immigrants.
mII. PRINCIPAL CASES-LOZANO V. CITY OF HAzLETON AND DAY V. BOND
This Part explains what steps have been taken by local and state governments
in the context of immigration law. Because the focus of this Note is to address how
courts' use of standing has and will continue to create difficulties in immigration law,
88 See Tell Me More (NPR radio broadcast Oct. 31, 2007), available at http://www.npr
.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld= 15803374 (Interview by Michelle Martin with Randy
Terrill, Okla. State Rep.).
89 See id.
9 Id.
9" See Lou Barletta, Small Town Defenders, Welcome to Small Town Defenders (June 13,
2006), http://www.smalltowndefenders.com/public/.
9 Editorial, The LegalRoute, DALLAS MORNING NEwS, Sept. 21,2007, at 18A, available
at http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/dws/dn/opinion/editorials/stories/DN-inline
_21 edi.ART.State.Edition 1.427fa5a.html. "Dream Act provisions" refers to provisions included
in Congress' failed comprehensive immigration reform that would have created a means by
which illegal immigrant high school students could obtain legal status through attendance at a
public university or service in the military. See S. 1348, 1 10th Cong. § 1 (2007).
91 S. 1348.
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the discussion of local and state efforts will be couched in a discussion of the judicial
challenges that resulted from those efforts, and how courts have addressed these chal-
lenges. Some states and localities chose to enforce restrictive legislation while others
chose to attract illegal immigrants by providing additional state benefits. This Part
discusses each method in turn.
In order to enhance the discussion in this Part, a brief review of standing will be
helpful. Under Article I of the Constitution, in order for an individual plaintiff to
be heard in a federal court, he must satisfy three requirements.94 First, the plaintiff
"must allege some threatened or actual injury resulting from the putatively illegal
action." 95 That injury shown by the plaintiff must be "'real and immediate,' not
'conjectural' or 'hypothetical."' 96 Second, the plaintiff must show that the injury is
traceable to the defendant in the controversy. 97 Finally, the injury alleged must be
redressable by the court, meaning that action by the court is capable of compensat-
ing the plaintiff for his injury.98
A slightly modified analysis applies to organization plaintiffs. Essentially, an
organization has standing to sue when "the organization's members would have
standing to sue on their own .... the interests the organization seeks to protect are
germane to its purpose, and.., neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested
requires individual participation by its members.""
A. Restrictive Ordinances-Hazleton, Pennsylvania
The city of Hazleton, Pennsylvania, with a population around 25,000,'° was one
of the first to fight back against the flood of immigration through restrictive ordi-
nances.10' Most notable was the city's "Illegal Immigration Relief Act Ordinance,"
" In reality, Article 1II only discusses the requirement of case or controversy, but the
Supreme Court has fleshed out this requirement. See infra notes 95-98 and accompanying text.
9' O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 493 (1974) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted).
96 City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983) (citations omitted).
" See Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765 (2000).
98 See U.S. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83 (1998). There are prudential
concerns encompassed in a standing analysis as well. See, e.g., Lozano v. Hazleton, 496 F.
Supp. 2d 477 (M.D. Pa. 2007). These considerations are not included in this discussion.
9 Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 492 (quoting Pub. Interest Research Group of N.J. v.
Powell Duffryn Terminals, Inc., 913 F.2d 64, 70 (3d Cir. 1990)). Further discussion of the
organizations party to the Hazleton litigation will be omitted for simplicity sake.
"0 History--Official Website of the City of Hazleton, Pennsylvania, http://www.hazleton
city.org/public/life/history.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2009).
' Daniel Patrick Sheehan, Pennsylvania Town Moves to Stem Growth of Immigrants,
PrrTSBURGHPOST-GAZETE, July 15,2006, at A10. By all accounts, San Bernadino, California
was the first city to take action to restrict immigration, and it was San Bernadino's ordinance
after which the leaders of Hazleton modeled their ordinance. See id.
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or Ordinance 2006-18.02 This Ordinance, approved on September 21, 2006, required
anyone applying for a business or construction permit with the city to sign an affi-
davit "affirming that they d[id] not knowingly utilize the services or hire any person
who is an unlawful worker.' 3 "Unlawful worker" was defined as
a person who does not have the legal right or authorization to work due
to an impediment in any provision of federal, state or local law, including
but not limited to a minor disqualified by nonage, or an unauthorized alien
as defined by United States Code Title 8, subsection 1324a(h)(3).' 4
An additional provision of the Ordinance prohibited the leasing of property to an illegal
immigrant while "knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that" the illegal immi-
grant was within the United States in violation of United States immigration law.10 5
The first violation of this provision would result in the landlord's inability to receive
rent payments or fees; subsequent violations would lead to monetary penalties."°
In the following months, Hazleton's city council also approved a "Tenant
Registration Ordinance," which required tenants to register for permits of tenancy
based on the legality of their status in the country, and an "Official English Ordinance"
which, among other things, prohibited the translation of any employment-related
documents into any language other than English.'0 7
Although the intended purpose of Hazleton' s ordinances was to reduce the number
of illegal aliens living in Hazleton (and any perceived detriment to the community
that resulted from their presence)," 8 there were clear repercussions for other groups
of citizens as well. Business owners were forced to verify the immigration status of
employees, an administratively costly endeavor for which most business owners do
not have training, " and landlords were faced with the same predicament. "0 Litigation
was a natural result of the ordinances as well."' While these citizens struggled to
102 Hazleton, Pa., Ordinance 2006-18 (Sept. 21, 2006), available at http://www.aclu.org/
pdfs/immigrants/hazleton secondordinance.pdf.
103 id.
104 ld.
105 Id.
106 Id.
107 See Lozano v. Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477, 484 (M.D. Pa. 2007); Hazleton, Pa.,
Ordinance 2006-19 (Sept. 21, 2006), available at http://www.smalltowndefenders.com/
090806/2006-19%20_Official%20English.pdf.
108 See, e.g., Sheehan, supra note 101.
"o See Kristina M. Campbell, Local Illegal Immigration ReliefAct Ordinances: A Legal,
Policy, and Litigation Analysis, 84 DENV. U. L. REv. 1041, 1049 (2007).
110 Id. at 1052-53.
"I Id. at 1050, 1053. It is interesting to note that the city of Farmers Branch, Texas, which
passed an ordinance restricting immigration discussed infra, text accompanying notes 149-53,
has established a fund into which citizens may deposit money to fund the city's litigation
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avoid liability for violating the city's ordinances, they found it difficult to operate
within the bounds of federal immigration law and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act,
both barring discriminatory practices in hiring and leasing.'
1 2
Landlords, business owners, tenants, workers, and various organizations filed
suit in the Middle District of Pennsylvania in an attempt to enjoin enforcement of the
ordinances.' 3 Their principle theory was that the Illegal Immigration Relief Act
Ordinance violated the Supremacy Clause," 4 the Due Process Clause,"5 and the
Equal Protection Clause"6 of the United States Constitution.
The court took great care in discussing the standing of these plaintiffs, address-
ing their complaints in tandem until reaching the issue of redressability. Every plain-
tiff satisfied the first requirement, a showing of injury." 7 After the ordinances were
passed, one landlord in Hazleton had difficulty leasing property and finding con-
struction crews to make repairs to his property. 8 llegal alien tenants suffered greater
difficulty in leasing and some were forced to move to new locations."9 Rosa and
Luis Lechuga, a couple who owned a Mexican products store in Hazleton, suffered
a loss of their usual clientele due to the exit of illegal aliens and were forced to close
the store. 1
20
Next, the court opined, with little hesitation, that these injuries were traceable
to the city's passing of the restrictive ordinances.' 2' With respect to landlords and
tenants, the court found that but for the Ordinance, they would not have suffered a
loSS.122 The business owners were also able to show traceability to the city, but the
link between the business owners' injuries and the city's actions was found to be
only partial. 23
Redressability, the final requirement in standing analysis, was the only issue in
which the court severed the claims of the plaintiffs. 24 The court held that an in-
junction against the enforcement of these ordinances would free the landlords from
the "burdens they face from such compliance" and ease the difficulty of securing
efforts. See Discover: Resources--City of Farmers Branch, http://www.farmersbranch.info/
discover/resources (last visited Jan. 20, 2009).
12 See, e.g., Campbell, supra note 109, at 1050. Title VII prohibits discrimination on the
basis of origin. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2006).
"3 Lozano v. Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477 (M.D. Pa. 2007).
"l4 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
"' U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
116 Id.
"' Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 484-99.
118 Id. at 488-89.
"' Id. at 496-97.
'20 Id. at 490.
121 Id. at 489.
122 Id. at 489, 498.
123 Id. at 491.
124 Id. at 487-99.
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tenants.125 The court made the same observation with respect to tenants.126 Only
with respect to the business owners did the court balk at granting standing to sue, but
this decision rested upon the fact that the business had already closed. 27 The court
seemed to imply that had the owners expressed intent to reopen the store or to re-
cover monetary damages, there may have been an avenue of redress. 2 At the con-
clusion of the standing analysis, the court granted the landlords, illegal alien tenants,
and various organizations (Casa Dominicana of Hazleton, the Hazleton Hispanic
Business Association, and the Pennsylvania Statewide Latino Coalition) 129 the right
to be heard. 30
After addressing standing and other procedural issues,' the court proceeded to
address the merits of the case. First, the court addressed the plaintiffs' complaint that
Hazleton's actions violated the Supremacy Clause, which states, "This Constitution,
and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all
Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall
be the supreme Law of the Land."'32 Under this clause, any state law that "'inter-
fere[s] with or [is] contrary to' federal law" is invalid. 133
Federal law can preempt state law through one of three methods: "express or
explicit preemption, implied preemption, or 'actual conflict' preemption., ' After
observing the employment provisions of the Hazleton ordinances in relation to the
Federal Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA), the court decided that
federal law preempted those portions of the ordinances by all three methods.135 After
consideration of the tenancy provisions of the ordinances, the court concluded that
because "Hazleton' s ordinances burden[ed] aliens more than federal law by prohibit-
ing them from residing in the city although they may be permitted to remain in the
United States," the tenancy provisions are conflict preempted by federal law.'
13 6
125 Id. at 490.
126 Id. at 498.
127 Id. at 491.
128 Id.
129 To maintain simplicity, the court's discussion of these organizations' standing is not
discussed in detail. In short, they satisfied the standards noted supra notes 94-99 and accom-
panying text. See also Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 491-96.
130 Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 504.
1' The court addressed the right of some plaintiffs to bring a claim anonymously and paid
some credence to whether the court could or should decide the merits of the case based on
amendments that were approved during the trial of this case. The analysis of these issues is
not crucial to our discussion. For the court's discussion and holding in these matters, see
Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 504-17.
132 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
'3 Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 518 (quoting N.J. Payphone Ass'n, Inc. v. W. New York,
299 F.3d 235 (3d Cir. 2002)).
"3 Olde Disc. Corp. v. Tupman, 1 F.3d 202, 206 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied sub nom.
Hubbard v. Olde Disc. Corp., 510 U.S. 1065 (1994).
... See Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 518-29.
136 Id. at 532. Some immigrants, although they may not be citizens or legal permanent
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The court additionally addressed a procedural due process claim brought by the
plaintiffs in deciding that the Illegal Immigration Relief Act passed by Hazleton was
unconstitutional.137 Other claims brought by the plaintiffs included violations of equal
protection, 138 privacy rights, 39 the Fair Housing Act,' 4 Section 198 1, 41 Pennsylvania's
Landlord and Tenant Act, 42 and abuse of police powers.'43 Further analysis of these
claims is not essential to this Note's discussion.
The legal analysis encompassed in the Hazleton court's opinion is no extraordi-
nary feat, but there is one important aspect of the opinion that should be afforded
particular attention. The court went to great lengths to emphasize the inability of local
governments to regulate immigration while remaining within their natural bound-
aries of power.'" In the context of preemption, for instance, it would have been suffi-
cient for the court to hold that either of three forms of preemption was evidenced by
the IRCA. Instead, the court waded through the various types of preemption with
painstaking detail, even noting at one point that the entire exercise was unnecessary.1
45
At every turn, the court made an effort to express its firm belief that Hazleton' s ordi-
nances were preempted.' 46 This point, and the fact that the court seemed so inclined
to uphold federal supremacy, becomes more important in the next Part, where this
Note explores other state and local attempts at regulating immigration.
B. Other Restrictive Ordinances and Legislation
Hazleton was not the only community in the nation to take such measures in the
wake of federal inaction concerning immigration. Other notable attempts took place
in Oklahoma, 47 Georgia, 4 ' and Texas. 149 A city in Texas-Farmers Branch-passed
an ordinance similar to Hazleton's in May of 2007.150 At the center of the Farmers
residents, may be allowed to remain in the United States, for example, while applying for
legal status or asylum. See id.
' Id. at 533-38.
138 Id. at 538-42.
'39 Id. at 542-45.
'40 Id. at 545-46.
141 Id. at 546-52.
142 Id. at 552-53.
143 Id. at 553-54.
I" Id. at 517-33.
141 Id. at 521.
146 Id. at 517-29.
"' 2007 Okla. Sess. Laws 112, available athttp://www.ocsn.netapphcationslocsn/deliver
document.asp?id=448995.
148 See Emily Bazar, Illegal Immigrants Moving Out, USA TODAY, Sept. 26, 2007, at A3,
available at http://www.smalltowndefenders.compublic/node/238.
14 See Bill Turque, Officials Face Constitutional Complexities, WASH. POST, Sept. 7,
2007, at B5.
so See Stephanie Sandoval, FB Prepares to Enforce Rental Ban; Letter to Apartments
Explains Restrictions on Illegal Immigrants, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, May 15,2007, at 1B.
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Branch ordinance was the requirement that landlords verify the immigration status
of potential tenants before rent payments could be accepted.' 5' A federal judge in the
Northern District of Texas granted a temporary restraining order to the plaintiffs in
that case one day before the ordinance was set to go into effect. 152 Currently, this case
is still awaiting trial." 3 A second ordinance, aimed at restricting tenancy to citizens,
passed in December 2007, and a lawsuit has been filed to challenge the validity of
its passage."
C. Legislation Providing Benefits to Undocumented Americans
To fully understand the impact of the Hazleton court's and other similar rulings
on the ability of state and local governments to regulate immigration-and to lay the
groundwork for the remainder of this discussion-the case should be contrasted
with other immigration regulation by state and local governments. While Hazleton,
Farmers Branch, and others responded to federal inaction with restrictive ordinances,
others have responded by providing benefits.'55
Kansas was among the first states to pass a statute providing benefits to illegal
aliens that were not available to United States citizens, approving K.S.A. § 76-73 la
on July 1,2004.156 Under the statute, any student enrolled in or accepted to a college
or university is considered a resident of Kansas for the purpose of assessing tuition
and fees."' This seems all-inclusive, but the statute's definition of "individual" nar-
rowed the scope a bit. Those students who had either attended a Kansas high school
for at least three years, had graduated from a Kansas high school, or had obtained a
GED within the state of Kansas were covered by the statute. 58 Those individuals
without lawful immigration status, in order to qualify for state residency for tuition
purposes, were required to sign an affidavit stating that they had either applied for
legalization or they would as soon as they became eligible to do so.' 59 Finally, those
individuals who enjoyed legal, but not permanent, status in the United States, were
Is' See id.
152 See Villas at Parkside v. City of Farmers Branch, No. 3:06-cv-2371,2007 WL 1498763
(N.D. Tex. May 21, 2007).
' See Patrick McGee, Landlords Planning to Work with City, FORT WORTH STAR-
TELEGRAM, Jan. 24, 2008, at B 1.
4 See id.
1' See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 76-731 a (2008). It is not entirely clear why some states
have chosen a course of action friendly to immigrants. One could argue that such legislation
is aimed at offsetting those restrictive ordinances passed by other states and localities, but
the fact that state and local governments have taken action, as opposed to the motivation for
doing so, is the focus of this Note.
156 Id.
151 Id. § 76-731a(a).
151 Id. § 76-731a(b)(2).
159 Id.
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required to affirm that they had "filed an application to begin the process for citizen-
ship of the United States or w[ould] file such application as soon as ... eligible to
do so.'
The thrust of this statute was that an illegal alien, living inside or outside of
Kansas, could be deemed a resident for purposes of registration and tuition so long
as he had attended a Kansas high school for three years and had graduated or earned
a GED. 16 ' Additional requirements were placed upon those who did not satisfy these
standards, 162 but these additional requirements were by no means insurmountable. Of
crucial importance is the fact that those benefits afforded illegal or undocumented
immigrants by K.S.A. § 76-73 la were ones for which out-of-state residents attending
Kansas universities and colleges were not eligible. 163
As is to be expected, parents of students who were residents of states other than
Kansas and attending Kansas state schools, and the students of those parents, filed
suit on several grounds.' 64 Alleging that the law violated 8 U.S.C. §§ 1621 and 1623,
and their equal protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, the students prayed
for declaratory and injunctive relief.' 65 A favorable judgment would prevent undocu-
mented aliens from taking advantage of the new law and its resulting, more favorable
in-state tuition rates.
Of the seven counts alleged before the U.S. District Court for the District of
Kansas, the court dismissed six for lack of standing.' 66 The most notable observa-
tion made by the court concerning this dismissal was that there was no "concrete and
imminent" injury suffered as a result of the statute's passage. 67 Additionally, enjoin-
ing enforcement of the statute would not provide a remedy for out-of-state students. 68
Those students who filed suit were paying out-of-state tuition before the statute passed,
and they would continue to do so regardless of the court's determination.
As to the final count alleged, the court accepted the parties' stipulation that the
plaintiffs had standing to sue, but held that the federal statute under which that count
was alleged, 8 U.S.C. § 1623, did not create a private right of action. 69 The ques-
tion of standing with respect to this claim was not addressed in any detail. 170
160 id.
161 Id. § 76-731a.
162 See id. § 76-731a(b)(2).
163 This assertion is made notwithstanding the possibility that Kansas schools may provide
in-state status to out-of-state students as part of a scholarship or fellowship program.
"6 Day v. Sebelius, 376 F. Supp. 2d 1022 (D. Kan. 2005), affd sub nom. Day v. Bond,
500 F.3d 1127 (10th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 2987 (2008).
165 Id. at 1026-29.
'66 Id. at 1040.
167 Id. at 1033 (citingEssence, Inc. v. Cityof Fed. Heights, 285 F.3d 1272, 1281 (10thCir.
2002)).
'66 Id. at 1034.
169 Id. at 1034-37.
170 id.
2009] 1231
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit delivered an important opinion. The court's dis-
cussion of those counts dismissed for lack of standing was similar to that of the district
court.' 7' The court held there was no injury suffered as a result of the statute, and
any injury that may be shown was not remediable by the court.'72
This was not the entirety of the court's opinion, however. Also on appeal was
the district court's determination that 8 U.S.C. § 1623 does not create a private right
of action for the plaintiffs. Where the district court had simply accepted the parties'
stipulation as to standing, the Tenth Circuit held that because § 1623 did not create
a private right of action, the plaintiffs could not show injury amounting to the con-
stitutional requirement of standing. 73 With this determination, the court precluded
any action by the plaintiffs against the Kansas statute because of lack of standing.
The effect of this holding cannot be overstated. Assuming other courts reach
the same conclusion, statutes such as K.S.A. § 76-73 la will stand without challenge,
and individual states will gain increasingly more power to regulate immigration, once
an area of exclusive federal power.
IV. THE PROBLEMS CAUSED BY THE DIVERGENT USE OF STANDING IN
IMMIGRATION REGULATION CHALLENGES
The problem created by divergent decisions involving standing is only magnified
when one considers the drive by states and localities feeling the pressures of immi-
gration discussed in Part II. Along with the nationwide passage of local ordinances
similar to those of Hazleton, Pennsylvania, and Farmers Branch, Texas,17 1 nearly a
dozen states passed legislation similar to that at issue in Day v. Bond.'75 Other states
are considering doing the same. 17 6 At least four other states have chosen the opposite
track with respect to the educational opportunities of illegal immigrants, passing leg-
islation that actively prohibits them from receiving in-state tuition rates. 177 With
many states taking action, it is only plausible that neighboring states will begin to
17' See Day v. Bond, 500 F.3d 1127, 1132-35 (10th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct.
2987 (2008).
172 Id. at 1135.
'71 Id. at 1135-36.
'7 See, e.g., Stephen Deere, Judge Backs Valley Park's Push Against Hiring Illegal
Immigrants, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Feb. 2, 2008, at A15 (discussing immigration ordi-
nance passed by Valley Park, Missouri); see also Marice Richter, Lewisville to Debate English
as the City's Official Language, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Oct. 6, 2008 (discussing immi-
gration ordinance passed by Lewisville, Texas).
' See Ane Turner Johnson & Steven Janosik, Illegal Immigrants; Assembly Should
Determine Who Can Receive In-State Tuition, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Jan. 13, 2008,
at El.
176 See id.
177 See id.
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feel pressure to follow suit. 178 In the end, our nation's immigration laws will reflect
exactly that which has been feared since before ratification of the Constitution-a
patchwork of immigration law with the potential to affect foreign policy in a negative
way, a lack of uniformity making immigration regulation increasingly difficult at any
level of government, and regulation of immigration by those governmental bodies
least equipped and prepared to effectively enforce federal immigration legislation,
namely states and localities.
V. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS AND COUNTER-ARGUMENTS
So what can be done to combat the threat to uniformity in immigration law?
Many ideas have been advanced in other contexts of law that lend themselves well
to solving the problems caused by selective standing.
A. Allow Case Law to Take Its Course
The first possibility, which is also the easiest to implement, is to simply let the
case law develop along the path it is currently taking. This idea can quickly be dis-
carded. As seen from the discussion of the principle cases in this Note, courts will
essentially intervene only when the activities of immigrants are restricted by legisla-
tion. When provision of benefits is the goal of legislation, on the other hand, courts
will show deference to the wishes of state and local governmental bodies.
At first glance, it seems odd to offer the very problem as a possible solution, and
that is why this approach is not a promising one. But one could argue, although rather
unconvincingly, that allowing case law to develop in accordance with what has al-
ready been adjudicated does not implicate those foreign policy concerns that underlie
a need for federal preemption and uniformity. After all, the main concern that en-
courages placing power over immigration regulation in the hands of the federal gov-
ernment is that mistreatment of immigrants may have drastic effects on the nation's
relationships abroad. 79
But again this solution is not really a solution at all and does not deserve any
realistic consideration. Adopting this approach would be the equivalent of ignoring
the problem. It is likely to be advanced only by those who have no issue with the cur-
rent status of immigration law. For reasons stated above, the problem at hand is not
"7' A front-page article in the Houston Chronicle on February 3, 2008, explores the results
of an influx of immigrants fleeing to Texas from nearby Oklahoma and Arizona, both states
where restrictive legislation has been the chosen weapon to combat illegal immigration. James
Pinkerton, Immigration: Crackdown in Nearby States Brings Influx, HOUSTON CHRON., Feb. 3,
2008, at Al. The stress to the public fisc brought about by the influx of immigrants from Latin
America is only magnified by additional immigration into the state from neighboring states.
See id.
179 See supra Part I.
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one that we can ignore. Patchwork immigration regulation, because it creates a
system of laws difficult for immigrants to navigate, carries serious foreign policy
implications, and state and local governments should not be allowed to tie the hands
of the federal government in such a crucial matter. Non-action, which is essentially
what this option represents, is not a viable alternative.
B. Grant Standing Based on Associative, Economic, and Expressive Injury
A second idea is to grant citizenship standing to anyone challenging state and
local immigration regulations. This proposal has been advocated by Professor Adam
Cox, 8° and is not as removed from the doctrine of standing as first glance would
imply. Citizenship standing would not be based on the mere fact that a plaintiff is a
citizen but, as Professor Cox shows, would be based on concrete injury that citizens
suffer at the hands of immigration laws. 81 The idea of citizenship standing in the
context of immigration regulation is little more than an application of standing law
already in place. Under Professor Cox's theory, there are essentially three types of
injury plaintiffs can show at the hands of states and localities regulating immigration-
associative injuries, economic injuries, and expressive injuries.182 As will be demon-
strated, the notion of expressive injury is the most viable alternative.
1. Associative Injury
Associative injuries refer to the desires of American citizens to freely associate
with whomever they please. 183 As Professor Cox points out, the courts have acknowl-
edged associative injuries in the context of family members, 8" American citizens
inviting speakers from foreign nations, 185 and employment.18 6 But courts have not
included within this notion of injury those cases involving excluded immigrants that
are not easily identifiable. 87
Because a finding of associative injury is premised on the fact that immigrants
are excluded, it should not be expected that courts' systematic finding of associative
injuries would have much impact on the problem at hand. It is true that in cases sim-
ilar to Hazleton, undocumented immigrants were targeted and excluded by the city
ordinance,188 and associative injury would provide a way to satisfy the requirements
180 Adam B. Cox, Citizenship, Standing, and Immigration Law, 92 CAL.L. REv. 373 (2004).
181 See id.
182 Id. at 391-96. Professor Cox's theory will only be discussed in the context of state and
local regulation because the concerns discussed in this Note are specific to those entities.
183 See id. at 391.
184 Id. (discussing Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977)).
185 Id. (citing Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972)).
Id. at 391-92 (citing Pesikoffv. Sec'y of Labor, 501 F.2d 757,760-61 (D.C. Cir. 1974)).
181 Id. at 392 (citing Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Gracey, 809 F.2d 794, 800 (D.C. Cir. 1987)).
188 See, e.g., Hazleton, Pa., Ordinance 2006-18 (Sept. 21, 2006), available at http://www
.aclu.org/pdfs/inmuigrants/hazleton secondordinance.pdf.
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of standing. But standing in those cases is already granted based on traditional
notions.'89 In cases similar to Bond, conversely, it is unlikely that associative injury
will be found by the courts because no immigrants were excluded by the statute being
challenged.'9 If anything, association was made more likely by the statute. All things
considered, it seems that finding injury based on associative interests will bring about
little change.
2. Economic Injury
Professor Cox's second idea for granting citizenship standing to challenge immi-
gration regulations is based on economic considerations.' 9' Not only are employers
affected by immigration regulation through an increased or decreased supply of labor,
but everyday citizens are also affected by regulation and the resulting ebb and flow
of immigrants into their state and local communities.'92
Because this notion encompasses the impact that the ebb and flow of immigrants
has on state and local government, it seems well-tailored to solving the problems that
lay at the root of most recent attempts at regulating immigration. But in the context
of those cases that have been brought before the courts, a finding of economic injury
would change little. In Hazleton, for example, standing was granted through general
notions of standing, with no additional considerations of economic injury.'93 In
Bond, the plaintiffs were denied standing because although undocumented aliens
were granted additional benefits through state legislation, there was no showing that
action by the court would alter the plaintiffs' economic situation.' 94 In order for the
plaintiffs in Bond to have a remedy, there must be some way for them to show not
only injury, but redressability.' 95
3. Expressive Injury
The final and most promising alternative proposed by Professor Cox is a finding
of standing based on expressive injury.196 The notion of expressive injury is based on
the interrelationship between expression on the one hand, and association and identity
on the other. 97 Association, or the collection of community members with whom
a citizen chooses to associate, helps to create an individual citizen's identity.' That
189 See, e.g., Lozano v. Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477, 487-504 (M.D. Pa. 2007).
'90 See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 76-731a(b)(2)(c) (2008).
'9' Cox, supra note 180, at 392-94.
192 See id. at 393-94.
'9' Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 487-504.
"9 Day v. Bond, 500 F.3d 1127, 1135 (10th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 2987 (2008).
191 Id. at 1134.
196 Cox, supra note 180, at 394-96.
"9 See, e.g., id. at 394-95.
198 See, e.g., id. Note that "association" in this context is distinct from "association" dis-
cussed in the text accompanying notes 183-90. Association in this context is the simple idea
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identity, in turn, is one way by which that citizen expresses herself.199 The illustration
does not end here, however, because citizens are not limited to expressing themselves
through individual identity. When individual identities are viewed collectively, they
create local, state, and national identities as well. 200
Because association is crucial to citizens' ability to express their identity, any
infringement on a citizen's choice of association should be viewed as an expressive
injury.20' Applying this interrelationship to the current context, it becomes clear how
immigration regulation may result in expressive injury. Because immigration reg-
ulation, whether implemented by the federal or a state government, has historically
focused on excluding or including particular community members, citizens' ability
to choose those with whom they associate has been restricted by such regulations.2 °2
As illustrated above, the regulation of association can have a great impact on indi-
vidual and community identity. When identity is regulated and no longer controlled
by individuals, expressive injury is the result.
It may be argued that because immigration regulation by state and local govern-
ments does not implicate the ingress and egress of immigrants on a national scale,
it has little impact on national identity and, thus, has little impact on individual ex-
pression born from that national identity. However, this argument is misguided. As
already discussed, regulation by some states and localities, if unchecked, could pres-
sure neighboring states to follow suit.203 The possibility of a nationwide policy result-
ing from such individual state action is not far-fetched or unreasonable, and the end
result would be the same as if the federal government had taken action itself. In short,
regulation of national ingress and egress is not the only means by which national iden-
tity may be implicated. Allowing state and local immigration regulation would
simply place states and localities in place of the national government as arbiter of
the nation's identity.
Additionally, interference with national identity is not the only means by which
expressive injury may be suffered. As discussed, individuals as a community define
state, local, and individual identity. Even if state and local immigration regulation had
little impact on national identity, this would not remove the concern that such regu-
lation would implicate state, local and individual identity. Accordingly, allowing
states and localities to regulate association through legislation, regardless of whether
that citizens socialize with one another, as opposed to any notion of injury that is premised
on the exclusion of undocumented immigrants. See, e.g., Cox, supra note 180, at 394-95.
199 See, e.g., id. at 394. This explanation is based only roughly on Cox's formulation, but it
highlights the way in which association and identity are related to the notion of expressive injury.
20 See, e.g., id. at 394-95.
201 See id. at 394-402.
202 See supra Part I. Professor Cox also posits that it is not inconsistent with our nation's
history to view immigration regulation as a means of defining national identity, including those
we deem worthy and excluding those we deem unworthy. Cox, supra note 180, at 394-402.
203 See supra Part IV.
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that legislation pressures neighboring states to take similar action, deprives citizens
of the right to identify and express themselves as they choose. Whether you view the
result of state and local immigration regulation as having the potential for creating
national policy or as a localized problem, expressive injury to citizens will be the result.
If the Hazleton and Bond courts had granted standing based on general notions
of expressive injury, the results would have been more favorable for the future of
immigration regulation. The court's finding in Hazleton would remain essentially
unchanged, and this result is acceptable because the court's ultimate holding was to
assert federal power over immigration regulation. °4
The adjudication of Bond, however, would have been drastically different. Grant-
ing standing to the plaintiffs based on expressive injury would have allowed the court
to address the more important federal preemption and supremacy concerns encom-
passed within Kansas's statute.2 5 It can be argued with some force that the court
would have resolved the case in favor of the plaintiffs.2 °6 Such a finding would have
restored consistency and uniformity across the nation in the context of immigration
law. The fears and concerns that originally underscored the placement of immigra-
tion regulation within the federal domain would no longer be endangered.
Granting standing to the plaintiffs in Bond becomes more desirable when one
considers the fact that no other remedy can provide relief. Because the plaintiffs were
out-of-state college applicants, access to political remedies was not available, and it
was precisely this scenario that three justices in United States v. Carolene Products
Co. implied is more deserving of judicial intervention.2° Considering the reality that
the courts are the only means by which the plaintiffs may obtain relief from their
expressive injury, granting standing to the plaintiffs in Bond becomes paramount.
Even if, after granting standing based on expressive injury, the Bond court had
upheld Kansas' statute, the result would still be beneficial to future adjudication of
immigration regulation. Such a holding would only result if no federal supremacy
204 Lozano v. Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477,517-33 (M.D. Pa. 2007). Perhaps standing
would have been granted to additional plaintiffs, but further analysis of that possibility is not
essential to this discussion.
205 It should be noted at this juncture that the Bond court also struggled with the lack of
remediability. See Day v. Bond, 500 F.3d 1127, 1134-35 (10th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128
S. Ct. 2987 (2008). This issue, too, would have been resolved by a finding of expressive injury.
Because the plaintiffs' complained-of injury would have been expressive and not solely based
on a higher tuition rate, the court would have had the power to strike down the statute and
restore the plaintiffs' right to associate with whomever they choose.
206 The complexity of predicting what the actual outcome of the case would have been
makes such an exploration impractical at this point, but the general consideration enunciated
in Hazleton lends support to this idea. See Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 517-33 (discussing
federal preemption of state and local regulation in the context of immigration). Additionally,
it is possible that granting standing to the plaintiffs in Bond may raise Fourteenth Amendment
equal protection concerns, but discussion of this possibility is beyond the scope of this Note.
207 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
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or preemption concerns were implicated by the Kansas statute208 In other words,
the considerations that have historically supported federal power over immigration
regulation2 9 would be protected. It should be expected that courts recognizing a
state's power to regulate immigration would only do so after effectively safeguard-
ing these historical concerns. Though a finding for the defendants on the merits in
Bond would signal a shift in immigration regulation and federal control thereof, that
shift would only come through proper adjudication of the statute's impact on federal
immigration regulation, and would not be based on the pretext of standing.
Aside from the efficacy of citizenship standing based on associative, economic,
and expressive injury, there are policy reasons that cut against granting standing based
upon such notions of injury.
First, there are concerns that such a loose definition of standing would subvert the
intentions of the Framers in limiting judiciary power to "Cases" and "Controversies. 21°
Although it may be argued that these notions of standing could be limited to immi-
gration regulation, one can easily conceive of valid arguments in favor of extending
the idea to other contexts of law. For example, it may be argued that standing based
on expressive injury should be granted to a litigant because racial discrimination
creates a stigma contrary to his chosen mode of expression. 21' Additionally, such a
definition of standing would implicate the Court's prudential limitations that, among
other things, bar against hearing "generalized grievances. 2 2 The assertion that the
standing doctrine will be eviscerated does not necessarily follow a court's granting
of standing based on expressive injury, however. Finding expressive injury in the con-
text of immigration is not completely foreign to current case law, and a granting of
standing based on such expressive injury would not require a vast expansion of exist-
ing adjudication.2 3 Because expansion of the expressive injury concept would be
narrowly drawn, expansion to other contexts of law is not a necessary result.
A second argument against granting standing in such a fashion holds that basing
standing on such notions impermissibly shifts the focus surrounding immigration
from undocumented immigrants to American citizens. 214 Encompassed within this
208 Analogizing to the court's decision in Hazleton, a court would likely conclude that
Kansas's statute should be struck down at least under field preemption. Congress, although
silent in recent years, has shown an historic intention of espousing a federal scheme of immi-
gration regulation.
209 See supra Part I.
210 U.S. CONST. art. HI.
211 Professor Cox references Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737,753-56 (1984), in which this
very argument in favor of standing was offered by the plaintiff. Cox, supra note 180, at 401
n.122.
212 The Supreme Court discussed the prudential concerns surrounding standing based solely
on an injury that is general, not specific to the plaintiff in Valley Forge Christian College v.
Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464 (1982).
213 See Cox, supra note 180, at 394-402.
214 See Stephen Lee, Comment, Citizen Standing and Immigration Reform: Commentary
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argument is the thought that only through supporting the claims of immigrants, as op-
posed to those of citizens, "can we hope for a Constitution that takes explicit account
of both substantive and procedural promises locked within the fundamental principles
of due process. '1 5 Additionally, granting standing to citizens where courts may not
grant standing to undocumented immigrants implies that courts are only concerned
with the injuries of immigrants if those injuries are suffered by citizens as well.216
Granting standing as Professor Cox proposes, however, does not distinguish between
illegal immigrants and citizens. 27 An expansion of standing to allow challenges
to state and local immigration regulation would not be limited to those challenges
brought by citizens, and the focus of immigration reform would not shift from un-
documented immigrants to citizens.
Third, as Professor Cox concedes somewhat in his article, it may be argued that
the political process provides a more appropriate remedy for those challenging im-
migration based on citizenship standing.1 8 After all, when injury is based upon the
notion of expressive injury, the injury suffered is widespread and, at least in theory,
suffered by all citizens alike. 219 As discussed previously, however, the political pro-
cess is not always available to litigants bringing the types of challenges that are the
focus of this Note. The plaintiffs in Bond, because they were challenging an out-of-
state statute, provide a prime example. Additionally, simply because the option of
political intervention is available does not prevent the courts from weighing in on
the subject.220 There is little reason to conclude that the political process is the only
proper arena for this discussion.
Finally, it is possible that citizenship standing could spur a flood of litigation
based on widespread injuries. If standing is based on expression alone, it is not dif-
ficult to conceive that a state law excluding undocumented immigrants would lead
to an insurmountable number of litigants bringing actions against that state. The same
effect would likely be seen in local governments as well. This flood of litigation, how-
ever, is not a necessary result. Furthermore, litigation is precisely the tool by which
citizens are empowered to assert their expressive rights. If state and local attempts to
regulate immigration are continually struck down, state and local governments will
begin to modify their behavior in accordance with court holdings. This process is the
same by which any individual rights are to be protected, and this process should not
be viewed as a danger encompassed with this Note's proposed solution.
and Criticism, 93 CAL. L. REV. 1479, 1499 (2005).
215 Id.
216 See id.
217 See Cox, supra note 180.
218 See id. at 409.
219 See id.
220 See Cox, supra note 180, at 409.
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Although citizenship standing through associative and economic injury appears
to be problematic, real promise is found in the notion of expressive injury. Through
such an idea, courts would be free to hear citizen challenges to state and local im-
migration regulation, and the end result would be restoration of federal power over
immigration regulation.
C. Distinguish Ingress and Egress Regulation from Within-the-Nation Regulation
A final, less promising, alternative is for the courts to adopt a distinction between
those state and local regulations concerning ingress and egress of immigrants to the
United States and those that simply regulate the activity of immigrants once they are
present in the country. This alternative requires an assumption, based on the imme-
diately preceding discussion, that courts would be willing to grant citizenship standing
in the context of immigration regulation.
The idea of creating a distinction between ingress and egress regulation and
within-the-nation regulation has some beneficial features. 22' First, it would be con-
sistent with the system already in place because treatment of immigrants present in
the country already depends somewhat on separate state regulations.222 For example,
some immigrant visas are dependent on state definitions of marriage, and offenses
that spur deportation are often categorized by the states.223 In essence, recognizing
state and local power to prescribe within-the-nation regulation would not be any great
extension of existing law.
It may also be argued that under this proposal, ingress and egress regulation, the
area of immigration that has the greatest impact on foreign relations, would remain
under exclusive federal control. The federal government would retain the power to
regulate immigration to the extent necessary to ensure federal interests in avoiding
foreign conflict. States and localities would be given free reign to legislate beyond
this point simply because the foreign policy implications are not so acute.
Applying this solution to the cases, the Hazleton result would have been vastly
different and the Bond result would have remained the same.224 In Hazleton, the
court would have simply stepped aside, allowing the city of Hazleton to legislate as
it wished and restrict the movement of undocumented immigrants within its jurisdic-
tion. In Bond, again assuming that standing was granted based upon citizenship status,
the court could have heard the merits of the case, likely ruling in favor of the state of
Kansas and upholding K.S.A. § 76-73 la, ignoring any notions of federal supremacy.225
221 See Howard F. Chang, Public Benefits and Federal Authorization for Alienage
Discrimination by the States, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 357 (2002).
222 See id. at 360.
223 See id.
224 See Day v. Bond, 500 F.3d 1127 (10th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 2987 (2008);
Lozano v. Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d. 477 (M.D. Pa. 2007).
225 See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 76-731a (2008).
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The result in Bond would have been the same, but the consequence would be a more
predictable line of case law and a better opportunity for state and localities to legis-
late in accordance with the law.
Possible benefits notwithstanding, there are serious flaws to granting citizenship
standing and distinguishing between ingress and egress legislation and within-the-
nation legislation. Although it may be argued that such an approach would be some-
what consistent with the nation's current handling of immigration law,226 stepping
aside while states and localities assert control over within-the-nation regulation would
foster the creation of a patchwork legislative regime that implicates foreign policy. 2"
Perhaps it is fortunate that we have yet to see difficulties resulting from divergent
state views on the handling of immigrants to date,228 or perhaps the danger involved
with the current legislative regime has not warranted action. Assuming either of these
possibilities represents reality, choosing to continue and extend this approach at a time
when states and localities have great incentives to take action would greatly exacerbate
the divergent treatment of immigrants and magnify the foreign policy implications
lurking underneath. An approach that frustrates exclusive federal power over immi-
gration regulation in such a way can only be tolerated to a point before it creates a
dangerous situation.
Additionally, asserting that ingress and egress regulation is the only immigration
regulation that implicates foreign policy is misguided. There are two sources of im-
migrant mistreatment that may implicate foreign policy-the denial of entrance into
the nation and the inability of immigrants to understand and navigate divergent reg-
ulations across the nation.229 Acknowledging state control over within-the-nation
regulation implicates the latter. Even if exclusive federal power over ingress and
egress regulation is preserved, the necessity of providing immigrants with a navigable
system of laws nationwide would be left unaddressed. Considering the great fervor
with which states and localities are pursuing immigration regulation, the result of
allowing states to prescribe within-the-nation immigration regulation will be a wholly
non-navigable system of law which will no doubt have a negative impact on immi-
grants and, as a result, have a negative impact on foreign policy.
It may be argued that eventually, action by some states will pressure neighbor-
ing states into taking similar action, thus creating a uniform system of immigration
laws. Instead of sweeping federal legislation, states acting individually will be the
source of this uniformity. But even if uniformity does result, there is no reason to
believe all states will fall in line with a single viewpoint. 230 At best, small groups of
226 See Chang, supra note 221, at 360.
227 See supra Part I.
228 See Chang, supra note 221, at 360. James Madison offered the same sentiment in The
Federalist Papers. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
229 See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
230 The issue of same-sex marriage, another hot-button issue, provides an example of
neighboring states not taking uniform action. Compare CAL. FAM. CODE § 297 (West 2008)
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states will act in unison in regulating undocumented immigrants within the nation's
borders. Although that result would create uniformity across particular regions of
the country, uniformity across the entire country is necessary to ensure fair treatment
of immigrants and avoid dangerous foreign policy implications.
CONCLUSION
It cannot be stressed enough that immigration is an issue of inexplicable impor-
tance in the nation today. States and localities cite a drain on resources unparalleled
in history, increasing crime rates, and increased strain on the public fisc. Whether
these harms are truly a result of increased immigration is a point of contention,23 but
the perception is great enough to spur tension and encourage action.
Adding fuel to the fire is the additional notion that immigration is an area of law
that historically has been and should remain governed by the federal government. But
there has been no response from the federal government in accordance with this his-
torical power. States and localities have taken the law into their own hands, passing
both restrictive and benefit-providing legislation that has inflamed the issue. Court
cases have resulted, and the problem has fallen at the steps of courthouses nationwide.
The courts' responses have not been beneficial. Granting standing to some plain-
tiffs challenging state and local immigration regulation and denying standing to others
has created confusion and disarray in the context of immigration law. Foreign policy
implications that originally underscored the Framers' decision to place power over
immigration in the hands of the federal government are implicated by recent court
holdings.
Several alternatives have been discussed in this Note, the most promising of which
is to grant standing based on expressive injury. This approach would allow for cur-
rent cases to be heard on their merits, and federal power over immigration regulation
would be reasserted. Given the foreign policy implications and other historical rea-
sons for placing that power with the federal government, there is no reason to assert
that this would not be a positive result. Even supposing federal power is not com-
pletely reasserted, this would only result if foreign policy were properly safeguarded
and a new method of analysis provided for future adjudication.
Until a resolution is reached, it is safe to assume that non-federal bodies will con-
tinue to take action. As success is achieved, more action will be encouraged. Absent
intervention by Congress, it seems that only citizenship standing based on expressive
injury provides any meaningful semblance of a solution.
(establishing the right to domestic partnerships in California), with NEV. CONST. art. 1, § 21
(making same-sex marriage unconstitutional in Nevada), and ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-101
(2008) (statutorily prohibiting same-sex marriage in Arizona).
23 See, e.g., SIMON, supra note 82.
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